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## United States Department of State

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Executive Registry

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Senior Interagency Group No. 40

TO: OVP - Mr. Donald Gregg  
NSC - Mr. Robert Kimmitt  
CIA -   
Defense - Colonel John Stanford  
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SUBJECT: US and ROK Responses to the Rangoon Terrorist Incident:  
Check List of Actions Taken

Attached is a check list as of October 21 of actions taken, and responses received to our demarches in a number of capitals, in response to the Rangoon terrorist incident.

Suggestions for additional measures should be sent to the Office of Korean Affairs.

*Covey*

Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary

## Attachment:

The Rangoon Incident - US and ROK Responses; Check List of Actions Taken.

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THE RANGOON INCIDENT - US AND ROK RESPONSES

Check List of Actions Taken (as of October 21)

Immediate Bilateral Actions:

Replies to high level demarches on support for ROK:

A number of African and Latin American governments have made public statements (some in the UNGA) and sent messages of condolence; most have said they will consider further action when there is confirmed information on who is responsible.

ASEAN governments have expressed strong sympathy for the ROK, and if North Korean responsibility is clear, may take some action against the DPRK. (However, their attitude toward the DPRK is complicated by Kim Il-sung's support for Sihanouk and the Kampuchean coalition.)

Canberra will reschedule Chun's trip; Prime Minister Hawke will (in principle) add Seoul to his Beijing/Tokyo trip.

We have urged the New Zealand government to consider sending high-level emissary to Seoul to reiterate invitation to Chun to visit Wellington.

Colombo sent acting foreign minister to funeral in Seoul; President condemned bombing in strong public statement; Chun visit tentatively rescheduled for 1985.

London has several high-level visits scheduled: Chun to the UK in 1984, high-level Ministerial and British naval visits to Korea in early 1984.

Paris sent a ministerial level delegation to the Seoul funeral, and will consider other actions.

Rome has sent messages and will consider high level visits; the Pope is scheduled to visit Korea in May 1984.

Tokyo will consider what might be done if North Korean complicity proven (in discussions with the Japanese here and in Tokyo we have stressed importance of avoiding "business-as-usual" attitude); Foreign Minister Abe attended Seoul funeral service.

Upgrading of Egyptian-ROK relations: On October 19 Ambassador made demarche to Deputy Prime Minister/Foreign Minister, who will raise with President. We will reinforce with Egyptian Ambassador here, and will ask other governments to weigh in. Similar approaches will be pursued with Government of Pakistan (delayed by Shiite holiday).

Discussions with Congress: H and EA have consulted with key members and staffers on a joint resolution, provided draft text and urged prompt action.

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Immediate Multilateral Actions:

ROK UN observer mission officers have told USUN that they believe it unwise to take any action in the UN until the Burmese publish the results of their investigation. ROK UN Ambassador Kim Kyung-Won stated that any effort to raise the incident in the UNSC or UNGA before the Burmese had issued their report could only result in tactical benefit to North Korea. At this point, Kim indicated that he was considering sending a preliminary, low-key letter to the Secretary General expressing ROK concern over the incident and alluding to possible North Korean responsibility. He would not, however, ask the SYG to circulate the letter as a UN document.

IO has determined that the most appropriate UN bodies in which to raise the issue when the Burmese investigation is concluded are the UNGA committees, the Human Rights Commission (HRC) and possibly the Security Council. The HRC will next meet in February-March 1984. The various technical agencies of the UN would not appear to be relevant fora in which to raise this incident; (in any event we have been trying to keep extraneous political issues out of these agencies). We are inclined not to press any multilateral actions until the ROK indicates it wishes to proceed.

Drafted:EA/K:BSHarvey/IO/UNP:JBruno  
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